Political Competition, Partisanship, and Policy Making in Latin American Public Utilities

Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
List of Acronyms......Page 13
Acknowledgments......Page 15
Introduction......Page 19
Setting the Stage......Page 22
Implications......Page 27
Research Design and Road Map......Page 30
1 Voice and Light THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRICITY REFORM......Page 34
Disaggregating Market-Oriented Reforms as a Dependent Variable......Page 35
Reform Adoption......Page 36
Regulatory Content......Page 38
Political Competition and Citizens’ Voice in Policy Adoption......Page 41
Casting Light on Policy Choice: Partisan Orientation and Policy Content......Page 47
Postreform Policy Making in Public Utilities......Page 57
Regulatory Reform as a Dependent Variable......Page 59
Political Competition and Partisanship in Postreform Policy Making......Page 60
Providers’ Preferences on Regulatory Redistribution......Page 68
Summary and Implications......Page 71
Political Competition and Public-Utility Reform......Page 73
Modeling Policy Adoption and Political Competition......Page 75
Privatization of Telecommunications......Page 81
Privatization of Electricity......Page 86
The Opening of Markets to Private Investment......Page 90
The Establishment of Regulatory Agencies in Telecommunications......Page 91
The Establishment of Regulatory Agencies in Electricity......Page 96
Summary of Results......Page 97
Chile: Policy Adoption with Repressed Political Competition......Page 98
Mexico: Successive Reform Efforts under Political Liberalization......Page 101
Argentina: Democracy with Changing Political Competition......Page 108
Conclusion......Page 115
Partisanship: Constituencies, Ideas, and Experts......Page 117
Reformers’ Preferences in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico......Page 121
Regulatory Content in Electricity Reform......Page 129
Policy Content in Telecommunications Reform......Page 136
Market Size and Regional Patterns......Page 143
Alternative Hypotheses Explaining Policy Content......Page 157
Conclusion......Page 161
4 Postreform Regulatory Redistribution in Chile......Page 163
Political Competition......Page 165
Partisanship......Page 167
Regulatory Legacies and Market Structure......Page 171
Regulatory Reforms in Electricity......Page 175
The 1999 Electricity Reform......Page 177
The 2004 Reform......Page 181
Regulatory Reforms in Telecommunications......Page 184
Regulatory Redistribution, Political Incentives, and Institutional Effects......Page 191
Political Competition, Partisanship, and Institutional Legacies in Postreform Argentina......Page 196
Political Competition......Page 197
Partisanship......Page 199
Regulatory Legacies and Market Structure......Page 203
Regulatory Redistribution in Electricity......Page 205
Regulatory Redistribution in Telecommunications......Page 212
Macroeconomic Crisis and Regulatory Reform......Page 221
Political Competition......Page 224
Partisanship......Page 226
Institutional Legacies and Market Structure......Page 229
Postreform Regulatory Redistribution......Page 230
Summary of Postprivatization Regulatory Redistribution......Page 240
Bringing the Pieces Together in a Multilevel Analysis of Policy Making......Page 244
The Search for Causal Mechanisms......Page 252
Political Incentives and Latin American Policy Making......Page 257
Policy Feedback Effects and Weak Institutions......Page 261
7 Conclusion......Page 263
The Policy Effects of Electoral Competition under Conditions of Capital Scarcity......Page 265
Partisan Policy Makers, Allied Experts, and Regulatory Design......Page 268
The Politics of Redistributive Regulation: Lessons from Public Utilities......Page 271
Concluding Remarks: Extending the Argument......Page 274
References......Page 279
Index......Page 305